

Introduction. Walls: Ways of Being, Ways of Functioning, Ways of Being Transformed

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The reality contained within a wall, and a border, is very complex, as is the context in which it is embedded. This introduction analyses that complexity and examines practical examples of walls which are still highly visible in the towns or cities crossed by, or located close to, a border but which are also present in rural or other non-urban settings.

Walls Hard and Soft: Images and Historical Experiences

The idea of a wall evokes classic models such as the Great Wall of China, the Roman *limes*, the modern fence, the ghetto, the metropolitan banlieue, the favela, the gated community. Walls thus conceived generally function for empires and (less frequently) states and within cities; they are built by wealthy social groups and nations to protect themselves from or marginalise the poor and the different. There are also ethnic and ideological groups which erect walls or see them erected around them. Walls have been present in every age and every society; although they may be metaphorical and invisible, they are no less effective than physical walls.

Such walls abound in descriptions in the literature and in personal experience. I am put in mind of the invisible wall between Jews and Christians in a village street near Manchester described by Harry Bernstein (2006). I recall the state of affairs in a country village (population 2,000) in Emilia (Italy) in the 1950s. It was divided into two impenetrable parts; what might today be called 'no-go areas':¹ Communists on one side and Christian Democrats and Catholics on the other. On one side people gathered in the social centre (*casa del popolo*), children enrolled in the Pioneers and the cinema showed socialist films. That part of town had its own bakery and its own bar, and everyone shopped at the cooperative. Weddings were held in the Town Hall and funerals were non-religious. On the other side people went to church, belonged to Azione cattolica and other Catholic associations, and watched films at the parish cinema. That side of town had its own bakery, its own bar and its own

1 From personal experience.

general store; weddings and funerals were held in church. Crossing the wall between the two sides was not an option. If a Communist wanted to attend Mass s/he had to go to another town, and the further away the better.

One feature distinguishing the various types of wall is the form of protection it is supposed to provide. Protection against the loss of freedom is the type characterising empires which have achieved an external-internal balance and seek to assure their global position and at the same time prevent the immigration of the world's poor, who would jeopardise their internal social equilibrium.

The Chinese and Roman empires built walls as a protection against barbarian invasions, to defend their territorial and political integrity. Modern "empires"² such as the United States and the European Union protect themselves against immigrants from impoverished countries seeking a decent life and an escape from war, terrorism and persecution. They either prevent such immigration or adopt quota-based regulations. The justification given for quota systems (in use at Ellis Island from 1892 to 1954) and closure to the outside is the need to prevent the poverty imported by immigrants from disrupting the balance between the indigenous classes living in the empire.

Put otherwise, walls are erected to preserve (defend) the social, economic, cultural and political equilibrium within the empire, the state, the metropolitan city and every town.

Not only are there highly visible and extremely long walls between empires, between states lying on imperial borders (North and South Korea, Greece and Turkey, the Berlin Wall) and between large states with unresolved border problems (India and Pakistan); there are also walls around poor or rich minorities, between different cultures and different ethnic groups within states or more often within towns and cities. They produce ghettos, refugee camps, slums, favelas, gated communities, lazar houses and metropolitan banlieues.

The ghetto (from the Venetian "geto"—meaning an iron foundry—which the local German-born Ashkenazi Jews pronounced "ghèto") was the name given to that part of Venice from the 14th century (Calimani 1995;

2 The term "empire" is used here in a sense more metaphorical than with regard to earlier empires (Chinese, Roman, Persian, Holy Roman, Spanish, Habsburg, German, and so on), which were marked by territorial continuity and one overarching state power. These modern empires are an expression of the current process of globalisation of states. They are empires in which a dominant state lies at the centre of an international system which exercises its imperial function through political and economic power but also cultural and ideological power, and through circles of states which coalesce around the dominant state. In truth something of the kind developed under the Roman empire with the formation around it of client states such as Judaea, Commagene, Pergamon, Armenia and others in Anatolia.

Quétel 2013:65–66). It was only a century later that it became identified as a poor district. It was surrounded by a wall, and within it the Jews lived, worked and ran their shops; in the evening the wall was sealed by the gates built into it. In 1555 Pope Paul IV decreed the establishment of the Rome ghetto; the Papal Bull “Cum nimis absurdum” compelled the Jews to live in a circumscribed area and laid down a series of restrictions that remained in force for centuries (Calimani 2000:94–95; Quétel 2013:67). The ghettos were later dismantled, and the walls around them were abolished in the 19th century. The last one to disappear in western Europe was in Rome, when the temporal powers of the Papal States were virtually abolished in 1871. Forms of ghetto also existed in Muslim cities; they went by the name of Mellah in Morocco and Hara or Mahale in Persia (Quétel 2013:70).

Other types of walled districts (physical, social or cultural) take various forms: Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon and Jordan (Sacca 2007; Fashtanghi 2014); refugee camps in Darfur (Quach 2004; Darren 2008; Duta 2009) and Jordan (holding Syrians);³ favelas, squats (United Nations 1971; vv. AA. 2012) and communities of migrants from rural to urban areas; slums and new ghettos formed by immigrants from abroad;⁴ the Parisian banlieues (Chombart de Lauwe 1960; Boumaza 1988; Caldiron 2005; Pironet 2006; Marconi 2007; Melotti 2007), largely inhabited by families from former colonies; what were known as the “Coree” in northern Italian cities (especially Milan) formed by immigrants from the south;⁵ the “Borgate” on the periphery of Rome inhabited by former residents of the city centre and southern immigrants in the 1960s;⁶

3 A consequence of the Syrian civil war and the recent rise of ISIS.

4 In particular the slums formed and being formed as a result of immigration from former Communist countries, as well as African and Asian countries in an attempt to escape political violence and poverty.

5 The “Coree” were common in and around Milan in the 1960s and early 1970s. In the Milanese dialect “Corea” means “a place of poverty, hunger, degradation and death. It is set in contrast with Milan, the metropolis of luxury, opulence, work and the future” (Alasia and Montaldi 1975:10). Formed by immigrants from southern Italy and poor areas in the north (such as Polesine in Veneto), they were created by the occupation and conversion of farmhouses and rural buildings in the area around Milan and by the illegal construction of houses by the immigrants, who found work as building labourers and street traders. In a period of economic boom and rapid industrial modernisation the immigrants arrived illegally and did their best to get by and avoid being sent back to their home towns. Promoted by Danilo Dolci, Franco Alasia Danilo Montaldi, research published in 1960 sheds light on the subject. A 1975 edition is entitled *Milano, Corea. Inchiesta sugli immigrati* (Feltrinelli, Milan).

6 Since it became capital of the kingdom of Italy, the development of Rome has never been planned along the lines of an industrial city. Fascist policy was to make it the heir of the

unauthorised camps set up by Roma originating from eastern Europe;⁷ Indian, Pakistani and Filipino quarters in cities in the Arab Emirates; other districts marked by a radical social and ecological difference from the rest of a city. The sharp differentiation of these marginalised quarters—which are further discussed in various parts of the book—from the rest of the city and the nation assumes the characteristics of a wall. That is because their populations are both homogeneous with and different from the populations outside the wall, and the latter have no effect on the equilibrium achieved and consolidated inside it.

The focus of the research carried out by the scholars of the Chicago School was the community and its borders. In some cases borders are characterised as walled; in others the community is divided from the outside by its strong internal cohesion in the form of “natural areas”. The School concentrated above all on how borders change over time as a result of “invasion” from the outside and the “succession” (Zorbaugh 1983:230–235) of new ethnic groups. Typically, a quarter was initially inhabited by Anglo-Saxons, who were replaced by Irish, who were in turn replaced by Scandinavians, and the process continued with the arrival of Germans, Poles, Russians, Italians, Afro-Americans, Puerto

Roman Empire, which resulted in the demolition of the old (medieval) working-class areas in the city centre to make way for Via dei Fori Imperiali and refurbish Piazza Venezia, and the area between Borgo Santo Spirito and Borgo Sant'Angelo to make way for Via della Conciliazione between Castel Sant'Angelo and St. Peter's Square. The people living and working in these (and other) areas were moved to new social housing built on the outskirts of the city. These new residential areas were augmented or expanded as a result of immigration from 1946 onwards, but above all in the 1960s. This expansion was conducted without any official authorisation and took no account of any urban planning. In one case “the Borghetto Alessandrino was started following the unauthorised parcelling out of some ‘war allotments’ immediately after the war. The numerous immigrants . . . built their houses first in wood and then with bricks and mortar. Once the war allotments had been used up, the immigrants began building on adjacent land which was almost exclusively state property” (Antiochia 1968–1969:105). This phenomenon and its social consequences were studied in social research and in other disciplines, which produced a large body of literature and films for the purpose of informing public opinion and exposing the scandal. The prime mover in the sociological studies was Franco Ferrarotti, who worked through the journal “*La critica sociologica*”, founded by him in 1967; further research was carried out by Corrado Antiochia (1968–1969), Franco Martinelli (1986), Giovanni Berlinguer (1976), Giovanni Berlinguer and Piero Della Seta (1976). In cinematic studies the leading light was Pier Paolo Pasolini and the best films on the subject were “*Accattone*” (1961) and “*Mamma Roma*” (1962).

7 A relatively recent development in Italy and Spain, this is a result of Roma immigration following the entry of Romania and Bulgaria into the EU and the opening of EU internal borders.

Ricans, Asians, and so on. The School centred most of its studies on particular areas in the city of Chicago. Such areas were often slums of what was known as the “zone in transition” (Burgess in “The City”, 1925), where the groups replaced by new arrivals moved to more stable neighbourhoods. As part of this pattern, improvised settlements of vagabonds sprang up alongside urban railway lines (“The Hobo” by Nels Anderson, 1923); inner city waste areas became the ganglands used by young delinquents organised in groups of varying sizes (“The Gang” by Frederic M. Trasher, first published in 1927); other quarters took on the form of a ghetto (“The Ghetto” by Louis Wirth, 1928), with the social, religious, cultural, cohesive and commercial features, and the dividing lines, typical of a Jewish community; of the Lower North Side of Chicago Harvey W. Zorbaugh (1929) analysed the many “natural areas” in “The Gold Coast and the Slum”,⁸ observing and comparing their processes of change—one such area was Little Sicily; low-rent areas saw a spread of “Taxi-Dance Halls”⁹ (Paul G. Cressey, 1925/1932), which were indicative of ethnic succession trends because they attracted the interest of members of ethnic groups with high-up political connections (see Hannerz 137).

Walls: Security and Freedom

It is clear that in all these areas in transition in a city (specifically Chicago) and in these “natural areas” there are walls, of varying degrees of hardness,

8 The Gold Coast and the Slum were the socially opposite poles of the “natural areas” located in the zone in transition on Chicago’s Near North Side. The **Gold Coast** was inhabited by the city’s upper classes and the **Slum** was composed of at least two parts. The former was inhabited by society’s outcasts—hoboes and gangs of youths—and had a certain cosmopolitan dimension. The latter was inhabited by Italian immigrants, mostly from Sicily, who conserved their traditions and family solidarity; Zorbaugh called it “**Little Sicily**” and “**Little Hell**”. Between the two extremes were the **World of furnished rooms**, rented by spatially mobile single people; **Towertown**, the artists’ quarter; the **Rialto of the Half World**, centred on North Clark Street, which “at night... is a street of bright lights, of dancing, cabaretting, drinking, gambling, and vice” (Zorbaugh 1983:115), “and its people, its ways of thinking and doing... are incomprehensible to the people of the conventional world” (Zorbaugh 1983:126).

9 The **taxi dance halls** were places where three groups met: the dance-hall owners, the girls who danced for money and the customers. Such places were widespread in the United States in the 1920s and 1930s. In Chicago they were located mostly on North Clark Street (Rialto) and were frequented by the singles renting furnished rooms and young taxi-dancers originating mostly from the Slum, Little Sicily and other nearby natural areas (Annerz 1992:136–141).

made up of arterial roads, canals and railway lines but also of radical differences between what is inside and what is outside the perimeter (see also research carried out in Udine to identify the walls between the town's quarters: Gasparini 1978). The hardness of an area's borders is also affected by the changes of population resulting from the successive invasions of ethnic groups referred to above; same may occur in the handover from the first to the second generation of a single ethnic group before it is replaced by new immigrants.

The process of succession in urban area, but also within national borders, brings to the fore another feature of walls: that of the security and at the same time the freedom that a wall is expected to ensure. To this our attention now briefly turns.

It may be pointed out firstly that in general terms walls represent a principle of order in spaces which would otherwise be in the sway of chaos and disorder. One example of perceived chaos is described by Dino Buzzati in his novel *Il deserto dei Tartari* (The Tartar Steppe) (Buzzati 2012/1940), where it represents the *hic sunt leones* from which the enemy may appear at any time: an enemy such as Warsaw Pact troops advancing on Italy and western Europe. The wall, represented in the book by the Bastiani outpost, divides order (on this side) from the disorder and chaos beyond it.

Walls are erected with the purpose of achieving individual, family, community and social security, but also in order to act out individual and collective will within the space they define, to secure within them a complete privacy, particularly in the functions described by Westin (1970). They are also a way to assert and consolidate identity.

A wall may thus be interpreted as a factor determining security and privacy in that it is an autonomous sphere and transforms disorder into order. One example is provided by the American pioneers: in the early days, in the absence of state law or its enforcement, they were at the mercy of predatory gangs, Indian tribes and the overweening interests of local elites (landowners, bankers, corrupt lawmen). Under these conditions they were compelled to defend themselves by erecting the best walls they could, such as the not particularly daunting walls of their own homes.

In sum, walls serve to ensure security from outside and freedom of action and planning inside (privacy). But it is clear that although such freedom and security produce order, such order is not necessarily shared and "just". It is one order among many, seen from an internal and an external standpoint alike.

In other words, a wall is a hard and rigid border, and the security it defends may be objective (experienced) or subjective (perceived and interpreted); furthermore the security it provides may be almost absolute, but hardly ever absolute. This also applies to the system of walls, real and tangible, represented by

the home for individuals and families—the wall may easily be breached. But such almost absolute security provided by a wall must, by analogy, apply to a group, a community and a nation. Yet the adoption of hard technology, as used in wall-fences, shows that even these can be breached or circumvented, demonstrating that absolute security is extremely difficult to achieve. Examples are legion: the Roman *limes*, the Maginot Line, in the present day the fences around Ceuta and Melilla, between Israel and Palestine and the United States and Mexico, in Kashmir—and many others—have been built, are being built or are being planned. But hardly any of them have withstood or will withstand pressures coming from outside, or even from within.

Walls and Borders in the Academic Literature

The literature on borders has often been a residual (or perhaps “creeping”) category, part of the prevalent analysis of the centre of a social system and relations among the elements within it. Interest in borders, more implicit than explicit, varies according to the type of system in question—states, organisations, metropolitan areas, or social systems in general. Or it varies according to the approaches developed in a range of academic fields—politics, sociology, cultural anthropology, geography, psychology, architecture, law and so on. One of the first works to present a systematic analysis of borders (and frontiers) was “*Théorie des Frontières et des Classes*”, published in 1908 by the Belgian sociologist and economist Guillaume De Greef. Other writers who explored the subject in the first half of the last century include Frederick Jackson Turner (1894), George Nathaniel Curzon (1908), Lionel William Lyde (1915), Thomas Hungerford Holdich (1916), Vittorio Adami (1927), Karl Haushofer (1927), Paul de Lapradelle (1928), W. J. Rose (1935), Derwent Stainthorpe Whittlesey (1935) and Roderick Peattie (1944).

A considerable amount of study has been devoted to tangible borders, above all state borders, while much less work has been done on borders of organisations, which in fact are replaced by relations between a social system and its task environment: that is to say, all aspects of the environment that are “potentially relevant to goal setting and goal attainment” (Dill 1958:410; Scott 1982:188), and in the case of state borders on international relations.

In the field of political borders there are theoretical studies on and scholars of borders, but they are mostly niche studies and scholars. More frequently found are studies and scholars dealing with borders as the result of a need to solve problems concerning the particular borders in question. In both cases the scholars have often been trained and have developed

their studies in research institutes and universities located in border areas. These include the “International Sociology Institute of Gorizia” (Istituto di Sociologia Internazionale di Gorizia—(ISIG)), the “Institute of Sociology” of the University of Graz, the “Centre for International Borders Research” (CIBR) of the Queen’s University of Belfast, the “Israeli/Palestine Center for Research and Information” (IPCRI) in Jerusalem, the “Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies” in Jerusalem, the “International Peace and Cooperation Center” in Jerusalem, the “Institute for Policy and Economic Development” (IPED) of the University of Texas at El Paso (UTEP), the “Centre for Baltic and East European Studies” of the Södertörn University of Huddinge, the “Center of International and European Negotiations and Mediation” at the Babes-Bolyai University of Cluj-Napoca, The “Conflict Resolution Trainers Group” in Nicosia, but there are many others. Such cultural and research institutes generally study peace, cooperation and cooperation strategies, all in a cross-border dimension. There is also a range of journals which have been set up in such border areas: “Journal of Borderlands Studies” (founded in 1986), “ISIG Journal” (founded in 1991), “Eurolimes” (founded in 2006), “IUIES Journal” (founded in 2007).

The literature on walls has diverse features. Research conducted in border areas characterised by walls tends to analyse how walls can be transformed over time by actions which make them softer, more akin to borders and more likely to disappear. Such actions take the form of meetings and discussions between stakeholders, involving local populations and immigrant groups, on the one hand, and the relevant state authorities on the other. The aims of these actions are to effect a change in the rules, starting with attenuation or modification of their enforcement. In this book the chapters by Hadjipavlou, Lundén, Donnan & Jarman, and Gasparini analyse walls from the perspective of over-coming walls and borders.

Recent years have seen an increased interest in walls. This is reflected in the publication of books by Chaichian (2014), Weber and Pickering (2014), Quétel (2013) and Brown (2010), in which walls are considered from varying standpoints: as the walls of empires, as death-producing walls, as fantasies of a walled democracy, among others.

In much of the literature in which they are featured, walls are considered in specific cases and in the present, which leads to conclusions prevalently expressed in terms of denunciation, with conflict analyses and ideological analyses designed for immediate political action. Such writing can become an end in itself, producing statements that add little to understanding of the wall. The academic process stops without proceeding further with the scientific method, which is not confined to a description and explanation of the

phenomenon in question but is also an attempt to predict how it can be overcome, to identify and explore actions and decisions which could change the wall in the immediate and more distant future—in a possible, probable and desirable future. It is hoped that some of the original contributions in this book will lead in that direction.

About this Book. Aims and Conceptual Grounds

This book deals with the security and privacy of the group living in the community and the nation in relation to the outside, and relations between the majority group and the minority group within the nation, a group which differs from the majority in terms of social, ethnic or cultural conditions or other criteria.

Put briefly, a wall can take on a variety of meanings. Of these, discussion centres here on the fact that a wall is a hard border which may: 1) represent a profound injustice, if emphasis is placed on the consequences of the expansion and openness of a society/nation, but in this case the wall may be hard for certain functions (political, sovereign, administrative, fiscal, etc.) but not for those of exchange (of power, economic, and so on); and/or 2) represent a rejection of diversity, real or imagined, and a desire for ethnic and/or social cleansing and homogeneity; and/or 3) separate spaces and territories according to the principle of territoriality (Somner 1969) and privacy (Altman 1976); and/or 4) represent the conditions for lasting peace, in that it neutralises the factors that may produce conflicts (tangible or ideological, cultural, ethnic, etc.); and/or 5) emphasise a form of rationality, in that it introduces and reinforces a division between the inside and the outside that passes along the (or a) border.

This book is addressed to academic specialists and intellectuals in general. It presents a number of original ideas designed to improve the understanding of walls and borders. It introduces concepts which go beyond the consideration of walls which remain hard; consideration which is often solely negative and expressed as a denunciation implying a duty to eliminate them. Here treatment is given to the variable of a wall's *time and dynamics*. In this dimension, from the “moment after” its construction, the wall begins to change into something softer, more of a gateway, as a result of the relations which arise in the locality (the cross-border area) and gain the upper hand over relations between states and between cities in states. The logic of the closed system, implicit in the construction of a wall around a system, is based on a rejection

of the resources (or some of them) coming from outside, which leads to an increase in the entropy and dissipation of energy¹⁰ in the system itself and a depletion of its creative capacity. This may be gradually replaced by the opposite logic of openness and external relations.

The contents of this book are also designed to contribute to a *definition of the concepts of the border and the wall*. Borders and walls are formed by the *association*, or the overlap, *between a line and an area* which become a borderline and a border area respectively. A balance between the two produces a border, and above all autochthony in the area of cooperation between the populations which straddle the border. By contrast, a border composed of a line without an area produces a wall, since the state (as the national centre) extends its homogeneous reach right up to the line which separates it from another state. Understanding of what happens at a border and a wall is assisted by the introduction of the cultural, social and economic component of cooperation between the populations living in the area which gravitates around the border as a line. This cooperation is able to *activate a state of peace* which is based on and experienced in everyday life, mediation and intermediate values which mitigate and demobilise the harshness of the clash between two opposed homogeneous entities bent on the pursuit of ultimate values. Cooperation, or even revolt, are the keys to a change in which a wall in particular, but also a border, is transformed into something else or even disappears—because cooperation comes about through macro-political decisions, or through a popular revolt. A case in point is the events in East Germany between September and November 1989 (exodus to the West through Hungary and Austria), followed by the fall of the Berlin Wall.

This stands as evidence that a wall, which may be taken as an instance of static reality, is part of a time, and progressively transforms itself into a border and may even cause it to disappear. In other words, the time variable (short and medium term) is essential for understanding how a wall can be changed. That is because a wall is always something that gives wrong solutions to problems which are sometimes real and sometimes invented out of the distorted dreams (see Brown 2010:110–142) of a culture that rejects what is different, thinks that radical solutions are the most effective (“once and for all!”) and is convinced that drug trafficking and terrorism can be kept at bay with barriers. But such barriers can be circumvented by criminal organisations; they are very expensive to build; and some elements of the public do not approve of them, starting

¹⁰ According to the definitions in the General Systems Theory (GST) and its geographical application.

with businesses in cross-border areas which profit from being able to pay low wages to foreign workers. Such internal opposition to the construction of walls is shared by other elements of the society which immigrants wish to enter, in particular intellectuals and people of a liberal mindset. It is thus observed in this book that attitudes in society to the wall are contrasting. On the one side is *political society*, or the structural society of rules and public institutions, which favours the building of a wall. Support for this political society comes from non-organised public opinion which is formed by the mass media and generally tends not to question tradition (with its consolidated view of right and wrong and the mantra “this is how we’ve always done things”) or the authority of those who use it. On the other side is the *civil society*, which tends to reject the wall because it is involved in international relations and shares a cosmopolitan culture open to the outside, directly and indirectly.

Another question discussed here is that of *interpreting peace* (as already mentioned) as the result of cooperation in a border area or across a wall, and therefore the configuration of such a peace as an *active peace* formed in the personal, social, cultural and economic relations of everyday life. This peace is a process of consolidation over time of the intermediate values established in everyday activities.

It is also highlighted that walls come in many types, act in different ways, and are activated by equally various functions, objectives and cultures. De Greef (1908) observes that these walls (or frontiers, as he calls them) are economic, genetic, aesthetic, psycho-collective, moral, legal and political.

An important dimension of the book is *methodological* in nature, taking account not only of the walls separating state and society but also of those which may separate any social system or organisation. The joint application of these focuses adds a great deal to the understanding of walls. The application of the paradigm introduced by General Systems Theory (GST) (see Bertalanffy 1968; Gubert 1972, Strassoldo 1973) highlighted the dimensions of the closed system and the open system. It showed that walls, by tending to emphasise the state or an organisation as a closed system, waste a great deal of resources, both in their construction and in that they give rise to a logic of autarky towards the outside and the use of resources which could otherwise be employed to improve the lives of the population (Ceausescu’s wall in Romania is a case in point) and the proper functioning of the system itself. Walls have the effect of increasing the entropy in a society. This book thus highlights the advantage of using scientific approaches whose specific characteristics are different in that they allow a reading of empirical reality with the use of diverse heuristic devices to interpret that reality in analogical terms.

Walls in Four Parts and Eleven Chapters

These are the conceptual dimensions on which the explanations of walls are based, and they are narrated in eleven dimensions: one general and the others specific to urban contexts, above all European but also referring to continental divides between Europe and Africa/Asia and between North and Central-South America.

As regards the meaning and contents of each of these interpretations and narratives, they are organised into four parts, ranging from the general and the past to the specifics of cases of cooperation and the future.

The *first* part of the book illustrates and provides a theoretical explanation of “*public walls dividing the ‘in’ from the ‘out’ from a number of standpoints*”

Alberto Gasparini describes these walls in terms of “*Walls dividing, walls uniting: peace in fusion, peace in separation*”. The chapter is organised into six sections. The first defines borders, using the single term “border” to subsume the range of other words which differ according to national contexts and the choices of the authors who use them; according to Franco Demarchi’s socio-linguistic analysis, they arise from the evolutions of the linguistic phases in which each of them has been used. The condition for the existence of a border is identified as the fact that it should comprise a line (borderline) between two entities—states, organisations, social systems—and an area (borderland). A border may also assume different forms: barrier border, gateway border, symbolic mental virtual border, administrative border. These forms basically depend on the equilibrium (or lack of it) between the line and the area. The second section looks at the duality of borders—introverted and extroverted. For the state and its system, a prevalently outward-orientated border has little importance because strategies for outside connection make it more provisional and mobile. A prevalently inward-orientated border is much more important and is strenuously defended, since the use of buffer strategies to defend the internal structure and its way of working (technical nucleus) reinforces the identity of the state and social system. The third section examines the definitions of a wall, identifying it as a closed border (barrier) but also as something self-contained and different from a border. Its originality lies in the fact that it is formed as the maximum expression of the line and eliminates the area, or operates as though the “intermediate area” (De Greef 1908) (that is, the cross-border area) did not exist. Many types of wall are discussed: the Roman *limes*, the medieval city wall, the wall of the modern state, the modern state wall reinforced by nationalist ideology, the walls of confederations and unions of states in the age of globalisation. It is pointed out that there

is a strong link between walls and “fantasies of a walled democracy” (Brown 2013:119ss.). The following section examines the violent face of the wall: a wall built where there is no border, a wall unlikely to be accepted on both sides, a wall imposed in response to aims which entail violence, a wall which may be built inside a single community. The next section looks at nine historical cases in which walls and borders stand in a relationship more problematic than the canonical type. These are: 1) the borders and walls of feudal states and city-states; 2) the process of development from a group of small states (or quasi-states) to a single state in which the border is a quasi-wall; 3) the border of an empire as the end of the world; 4) borders and walls in traditional communities; 5) a border which tends to become a wall when a state is treated as an extended local community; 6) a border and a wall being formed in the incongruity between the proto-modern state (still based on sovereignty) and post-modern globalisation; 7) borders and walls within states; 8) modern organisations as producers of soft borders which, from an individual’s point of view, are unlikely to become walls; 9) borders and walls which change from being lines to central points (airports resembling old city walls). The last section analyses the positive face of borders and walls and peace in fusion and separation. This comprises concepts such as cooperation and the operational assessment of how peace is produced by the reconstitution of a borderland (or intermediate zone) which goes beyond the borderline marked by a wall. Such cooperation strengthens identity and belonging; it responds to needs such as participation, transparency and borderland strategies; it brings forth new institutions with their own functions, such as Euroregions. All this is developed so as to bring about an active peace not only between border areas but between areas once divided by walls—towns along the old Iron Curtain are an example. Such a peace also asserts itself where there are new and hard walls, because they prove to be increasingly volatile and pointless. The configuration of this approach to active peace around walls is extremely useful for an assessment of whether they can be overcome, especially compared to a solely negative interpretation of walls that goes no further than a denunciation, leading to a fatalistic and passive wait for their fall. All this is developed by means of an integrated scientific method which is not confined to describing and walls and explaining their effects but predicts their future consequences and explores and assesses strategies for controlling them.

This complex definition of borders and walls is exemplified in emblematic cases which are analysed in subsequent chapters. They are also highlighted below because they each represent a different dimension of a wall.

The *second part* of the book tackles the general theme of “*Macro walls and macro networks*”, examining present-day imperial walls at the borders between

North and South (specifically the north and south of Europe and America), but also networks within empires between towns and the walls, often invisible, which may form over time and through processes of differentiation and hardening within the empire of Europe. In actual fact, in their initial stages empires attach little importance to borders, and to walls even less (the Roman empire until Trajan, the early years of US power, the European Union until the 1980s), because they are in expansion and are certain of being able to face threats with adequate (if not brutal) counter-measures or by the creation of buffer (or client) states (the Roman empire), or because they have no properly organised enemies (“hic sunt leones”). It is in their phase of maturity, or of political and military (as well as social) organisation, that they come to be dominated by insecurity at their borders which induces them to put those borders under the highest possible level of control and render them “absolutely” secure.

In the chapter “*Why empires build walls: the new Iron Curtain between Africa and Europe*” **Max Haller** describes the origin of the idea of building a security barrier along the border of the Mediterranean Sea, and walls, in the form of fences, at the most sensitive locations in Ceuta and Melilla. Haller draws on historical and comparative sociology to reach an understanding of the relation between empires and great walls. He describes how for centuries the Great Wall protected the internal security and peace of the Chinese Empire, and how the various *limes* of the Roman Empire ensured security and gave the impression of preventing, or at least controlling, invasions by enemy armies and barbarian tribes. Subsequently, there arose states in which the role of walls was fulfilled by natural barriers, such as the Pyrenees in the case of Spain. Some smaller states had no need of walls because they did not require the finances needed for the armies necessary to sustain the weight of empires. The borders of states such as Switzerland, the Low Countries and Portugal thus remained untouched by the big powers of the time. Recent times have seen the construction of the Iron Curtain, a wall between Western Europe and the communist East built by the regimes in the latter to prevent their citizens fleeing westward. A number of lessons on contemporary borders derive from Haller’s use of comparative sociology. Trying to identify how the European Union exhibits features of a new empire, he observes that it is tempted to build a new Iron Curtain around itself. The EU certainly has no army of its own (though the Lisbon Treaty provides for the nucleus of one), neither does it have a real political centre. Yet, he argues, the Union is configured as an empire considering that 1) it is a numerically large socio-political and economic community; 2) it may be seen as an influential political power at a global level. It is a “civil and soft power” based not on military strength but on normative principles

and international negotiation in which a central role is played by the principles of peace, freedom, democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights. In this sense the EU can be configured as a new form of empire; 3) the border question shows clearly that the EU considers itself as some sort of new empire because it has instituted a free internal market (including the job market), the Schengen area and freedom to travel without national border controls, but more stringent controls on its external borders; 4) the Treaty of Lisbon comprises a general paragraph which states that EU member states are obliged to provide mutual assistance in the event of a military attack from outside. If the EU can thus be considered a new type of empire, the question arises as to the reasons (if any) for building a new Iron Curtain, and what form it might take. There are many reasons for, and some against. The factors in favour include relations between Europe and Africa (enormous differences in income, birth rates, political stability, etc.) and internal political trends (the rise of extreme right political parties and support for them in the mass media). Among the factors militating against the idea of a new Iron Curtain, Haller cites the need of European industry for cheap labour from outside the EU and the influence of humanitarian organisations, often closely allied to the Catholic and Protestant churches and a number of progressive political parties. He then considers the forms of border control which, if implemented together and intensively, amount to a new Iron Curtain: 1) the selective use of visas; 2) border controls effected by specialised national and European paramilitary personnel (Frontex); 3) cooperation between European and African states with bilateral agreements to establish preventative measures against illegal immigration; 4) internal EU controls on personal identity and the possession of papers establishing immigrants' rights to remain in a European country. These factors seem to confirm the development of an Iron Curtain. Haller is convinced, however, that three general factors show that such a curtain, should it exist, will be short-lived: 1) the contradiction between the Curtain and the basic right (UN Declaration of Human Rights, 1948) of every individual to move freely within the borders of each state and to leave his/her own state to go to another; 2) the identification of possible alternatives to the Iron Curtain between Europe and Africa; 3) the negative myths about immigration prevalent in Europe which identify migration from the south as a threat to Europe itself, but which take no account of the complexity of emigration, which may be permanent, temporary, circular or conclude with a return home in old age. Max Haller's chapter has the merit of providing a macro approach to the state and border system of an EU which has very recently been forced to face the fact that a new Iron Curtain shows profound weaknesses. Its low level of political integration means that the EU is not able to deal with mass immigration,

because national governments react to it by demanding a hardening of their borders—founder members and countries of recent accession alike.

Walls have lives; they are born hard and then grow softer, after which they may become symbolic and then even tourist and cultural attractions. This is seen in cases such as the Berlin Wall; they may go from hard to psychological, or turn into something else or even disappear altogether. Walls and their functions change, and this may occur more frequently with walls formed within empires. Here *walls* are very often *invisible*, since they are not clear in geographical space, taking on the form of political, economic and social discrimination, even to the extent of denial of full citizenship, thus contributing to the formation of a variable-geometry (or multi-speed) European Union. Over time such *invisible walls* in the EU empire vary in substance.

This leads to consideration of a second type of wall: one which is possible, and may disappear and then reappear. Such a wall may appear and disappear in that it may be visible or invisible, or may have a material and non-material character, because it may divide for reasons which are economic, political, social, psychological and cultural. It is more likely to appear within large states, where walls (old and new) are impalpable but real.

In the chapter “*The Enlargement process and the ‘dividing lines’ of Europe*” **Melania-Gabriela Ciot** traces the development of the European Union from the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC, 1951) and the European Economic Community (EEC, 1957) to emphasise the economic integration of the member states and the removal of customs barriers and restrictions on trade in raw materials. In this process the EU enlarged to encompass other countries, first in Western Europe and then in 2004, 2007 and 2013 to include states in Eastern and Central Europe. Its organisation was enshrined in rules and institutions of increasing complexity, designed to create a spirit of integration “to find a solution for the management of diversity, in order to erase the existing dividing lines from its interior. Enlargement policy was meant to increase the competitiveness of the European Union, but has it succeeded?”. In this enlarged Europe it seems that policies of differentiation rapidly create invisible internal walls between north and south and between large and small countries, giving rise to such phenomena as Euroscepticism. To ascertain whether dividing lines exist or are disappearing, Ciot starts from the European Social Model (ESM), defined by Butler, Schoof and Walwei as a model of integration policy and unity in diversity; based on a combination of economic efficiency, it comprises dividing lines at the political, societal, economic and psychological levels. At each of these four levels the author finds dividing

lines, or walls, between the original EU member states and those which joined later. On a political level she identifies at least three overlapping dividing lines (walls). The first is two-speed Europe: the line between its northern and southern member states. The second separates a federation formed by the 15 states which were members before 2004 and a confederation of the 13 countries which joined the Union after that year. This line represents a two-class Europe in which closer cooperation between one group of member states leads to their irreversible separation from those outside it—and irreversible means permanent. A social dividing line (wall) is built above all on the difference in social spending between member states: on the welfare state, the job market and labour costs. In 2009 there was a marked percentage difference in these terms between the countries which joined before 2004 and those of later accession, and between the western countries (and some southern states) and those in Central and Eastern Europe. The same pattern emerges in economic dividing lines, which are clearly marked in terms of purchasing power, unemployment and the migration of workers and students. The author also highlights how these dividing lines characterise people's psychology and culture, particularly in the form of a fear of invasion by migrants from Central and Eastern Europe. At the present moment, new walls are being built on national borders in the form of heavily policed fences: between Italy and France, France and Britain, Croatia and Slovenia, Austria and Hungary, Hungary and Croatia, Hungary and Serbia, and elsewhere. Is this to be ascribed to EU enlargement—too much, too soon? Rather, the author is convinced that the responsibility lies in hesitation in taking the decisions necessary to deepen European integration.

The last chapter of the section on walls seen from a macro standpoint returns to the theme of the hard continuous wall represented by the fence between the US and Latin America.

Dennis L Soden and Alejandro José María Palma ask the question “*Are walls a national security issue? A view from the United States-Mexican border*”. They document the deep and sometimes arbitrary contradictions: 1) between the functions of a fence/wall between countries with different levels of power such as Mexico and the US, with few border controls on one side and highly stringent controls on the other, and a consequent difference in spending; and 2) between the many poor countries of one continent (Latin America) and one rich country which is almost a continent in its own right (or with Canada). The authors list the problems caused by the fence between the US and Mexico built in pursuit of contradictory interests (homeland security and national security). They conclude that it is a failure because politicians are afraid to

redefine national security while the illegal flow of immigrants increases pandemics, pollution, poverty, drug trafficking and human trafficking, particularly on the American side of the fence, which is an extreme point of a continental border (between South and Central America and the North). In this border/wall area there is indeed a high level of violence in the form of murders, child kidnappings, disappearances, drug wars and so on. Both countries have developed specific policies. Mexico (starting with president Felipe Calderon) has invested heavily in a war on the drug cartels. The US did likewise in the construction of the fence, which subsequently required further spending on a network of surveillance cameras and sensors. In one episode, the Mexican police arrested six Mexicans who were tearing down the fence and selling the steel as scrap metal. However, the authors consider that the recent decrease in illegal immigration is due not to the Americans' investment in the fence and the technology attached to it, but to the fact that the economic recession has discouraged immigration itself. As well as running through wide expanses of uninhabited frontier territory, the fence crosses areas containing towns which have developed at specific points. In such towns the wall has given rise, as said above, to some of the most violent communities in the world—Ciudad Juárez, close to El Paso, is a case in point. To assure the function of border control and keeping criminal gangs out of the country, however, the concepts of *homeland security* and *national security* will have to be redefined. These two types of security entail different tools. The fence may succeed in halting illegal immigration and thus achieve its goals in terms of *homeland security*, but it does little to impede drug trafficking and terrorism and thus fails to ensure *national security*. To the latter end, the first requirement is to rethink US-Mexican relations. The fence-wall is not a *national security* solution because it was desired and built by one side only, while Mexico is simply unable to play an active role in preventing terrorist threats—different policies are required for that purpose.

The *third part* of the book focuses on borders and walls of a more limited nature—for the most part within urban spaces, although the real reasons for them are political, religious and governmental, in which security plays a fundamental role. It has thus been named “*State, security and ethnic-political walls*”. Five emblematic situations are examined: the Berlin Wall as a means to prevent a state's citizens from escaping (from East Berlin) to the West (Gabanyi); the wall between the Vatican City and Italy as a means to ensure the sovereignty of the universal state and peace in relations between the two (Mogavero); the wall dividing Nicosia and Cyprus and their sovereign political dimensions which resist fusion, and the people on either side of the wall who feel the need to take possession of the other side of the city and the state (Hadjipavlou);

security and other factors underlying the establishment of the Israel-Palestine wall and its possible consequences for the borders (Ben-Rafael and Ben-Rafael Galanti); the walls for peace in Belfast—from the need for security to normalisation (Donnan and Jarman).

The end of the Second World War gave rise to many cases of the division of single territories among the victorious powers: Vienna, Berlin and Germany, but also Venezia Giulia, particularly Trieste and Istria, are cases in point. In the Italian journal *Futuribili* Savino Onelli and Fausto Rotelli (1999:165–173) even presented a “retrospective forecast” (see also Besthuzev-Lada 1969:526–534; Choucri & Robinson 1978:110; Gasparini 1999:17–21) on what might have happened in 1945 if Italy had been divided into four spheres of influence. The Berlin Wall was a particularly telling instance of the negative impact on everyday life caused by the continental wall that went by the name of the Iron Curtain, which was its extension.

In “*The Berlin Wall*” **Anneli Ute Gabanyi** analyses the harbingers, construction and thirty-year consequences of the Wall, interpreting it as a complex fulcrum of international politics, even world politics. The Wall was built in a post-war era which began with a bipolar Europe (1945) and ended with the collapse of one of the poles, the Soviet Union, and the reunification of the two Germanies (1990). During that timespan the Wall went up in 1961 and came down in 1989. In 1945 Germany and Berlin had been divided and as such stood as the heart of the Iron Curtain separating western and eastern Europe. The Soviet Union envisaged Berlin as an integral part of Communist East Germany, but the city was itself divided into four sectors, three under western control and one under the Soviets. The result was the Soviet blockade on land access to the city from West Germany in 1948, to which the West responded with the Berlin Air Lift—227,264 flights carrying supplies of food and other materials to keep the city going. On May 12th 1949 the Soviet Union had to admit defeat, and the blockade ended. In 1952 Stalin proposed a peace treaty whereby he would acquiesce to the reunification of Germany in exchange for its demilitarisation and neutral status. West Germany’s rejection of his proposal brought it closer to the Western Allies and their institutions such as NATO and the treaties which paved the way for the subsequent formation of the European Union. The factors which kept Berlin divided and led to the construction of the Wall were the desire to stop East Germans fleeing to the West and to prevent German reunification. It has been calculated that between 1949 and 1960 2,686,942 refugees escaped to the West. For Khrushchev, putting a stop to this flight and the consequent construction of the Wall were essential for the vitality of East Germany, for Communist ideology and for his own political survival.

The desire to prevent German reunification, however, was in fact shared by the West, though it expressed that desire differently. The Soviets made their intentions clear by authorising the construction of the Wall in August 1961 and rapidly bringing East Germany into the Warsaw Pact when West Germany joined NATO. Official and unofficial reactions to the Wall revealed Western attitudes: French minister of defence Pierre Messmer said that the French were not ready to “die for Berlin”; the British ambassador in West Germany stated “I personally have always wondered that the East Germans waited so long to seal this boundary”; US president Kennedy opined in private that the construction of the Berlin Wall “is not a very nice solution, but a wall is a hell of a lot better than a war”; German chancellor Willy Brandt confessed that the building of the Wall had been at the root of his new *Ostpolitik*. The end of the Berlin crisis and the advent of the Wall thus marked an explicit change in Anglo-American policy on German reunification. It was not until the end of the 1980s and the fall of the Wall that reunification returned to the political agenda. In the four-power negotiations, Mikhail Gorbachev attempted to prevent a linkage between the prospect of the reunification of a demilitarised Berlin and a reunified Germany outside NATO, but he was frustrated by American support for the West German government. In the resulting Two plus Four Agreement (the two Germanies plus the four victorious World War II powers) signed in 1990 not all the participants showed the same attitude to reunification—reservations were voiced by the British and the French, and by countries outside the grouping such as Giulio Andreotti’s Italy.

In the chapter “*Vatican City—Italy wall: consolidating social and political peace*” **Domenico Mogavero** considers another function of a wall—laying the foundations for political peace between new states which have radically new roles. Thus, since 1871 a wall in Rome has separated the Vatican City from Italy, originating from the need to make and consolidate peace between the two states. The passage from Papal State to Vatican City in 1871 was the result of a series of previous upheavals and required a series of subsequent rearrangements. In 1859 and 1860 there began a chain of events which culminated in the political unification of Italy, with the exception of Rome and Veneto. It started with a war between Austria and the King of Sardinia (and Piedmont) Victor Emanuel II of Savoy, allied with France under Napoleon III—the outcome was the annexation of Lombardy by the victorious House of Savoy. Against the wishes of the French emperor, Victor Emanuel then proceeded to annex the independent states of the Duchy of Modena, the Duchy of Parma, the Grand Duchy of Tuscany and the Papal States (Romagna, Marche, Umbria and Latium), leaving only Rome to the Pope. In 1860 Giuseppe Garibaldi fought

his way northwards from Sicily to Abruzzo, and met Victor Emanuel at Teano, where he presented him with his conquest of the southern half of Italy, the Kingdom of Two Sicilies. Following the proclamation of the Kingdom of Italy in 1861, the capital was moved from Turin to Florence (in 1865) pending its definitive transfer to Rome. However, the King of Italy (of a secular disposition, like the rest of the elite which unified the country) did not dare to occupy Rome—the Pope enjoyed the explicit support of France and the tacit backing of other Catholic states, but above all the majority of the Italian population (unlike the elite) were Catholics. So he bided his time until Napoleon III was defeated by the Prussians (Franco-Prussian War, 1870) and then moved his capital to Rome. However, the Italian government felt bound to find a solution acceptable to Pope Pius IX, who would not agree to confinement within the walls of what was to be called the Vatican City. Domenico Mogavero argues that the solution eventually adopted led the Catholic Church to a full recovery of its spiritual and religious vocation, enhancing its position as a global point of reference for ecclesiastic and diplomatic relations. His analysis of relations between the new Vatican State and Italy shows how the walled city—more politically than physically—of the Papacy, of globalised religion, co-exists with a normal national state, which takes account of the importance of the Catholic community worldwide but particularly in Italy. The author starts by looking at the *Leggi delle guarentigie* (guarantee laws) enacted and implemented by the Italian state, though not accepted by Pius IX. They recognised, among other things, that the person of the Supreme Pontiff was sacred and inviolable (Art. 1), that the Italian government rendered sovereign honours to the Supreme Pontiff in Italy (Art. 3), that the Supreme Pontiff would continue to have at his disposal the Apostolic Palace within the Vatican walls, and also the Lateran Palace, the Archbasilica of St. John Lateran and the Papal residence at Castel Gandolfo (Art. 5), and that the Supreme Pontiff was free to perform all the functions of his spiritual ministry (Art. 9). From these articles alone it transpires that the Papal State was formally abolished, a fact to which the Pope had by this time resigned himself, but also that he was no longer sovereign of the state of the Holy See. That was the principal reason for the Pope's determined opposition to those laws, which led to a long period of his isolation inside the Vatican walls, and with him (in a broader sense) all Italian Catholics. Mogavero goes on to recount 59 years (from 1870 to 1929) which saw a gradual shift in relations towards formal reconciliation by means of the integration of Italian Catholics into the everyday and political life of the state, and of the Papacy in its sole function of religious and spiritual ministry. With the signing of the Lateran Treaty in 1929 the wall between Italy and the Holy See no longer constituted a prison; it was the recognition of a formal border between two states.

“Italy recognises the international sovereignty of the Holy See as an attribute inherent to its nature” (Art. 2) “thereby creating the Vatican City for the special purposes and in the manner laid down in this Treaty” (Art. 3). Combined with the Lateran Treaty was a Concordat, which “assured religious peace for the Italian faithful, no longer compelled to choose between loyalty to the Pope and loyalty to the unified Italian state with Rome as its capital” (Mogavero). Fifty-five years later the Holy See and the Italian state proceeded to a revision of the 1929 Concordat with an *Accordo con protocollo addizionale* (Additional Protocol), signed on February 11th 1984. Among the factors necessitating this agreement, Mogavero cites the Second World War, the fall of Fascism, the integration into the Italian constitution of the Treaty’s recognition of the sovereignty of the Holy See, the Second Vatican Council, and the changes which Italian society had undergone.

In the chapter “*The ‘crossing’ along the divide: the Cypriot experience*”, **Maria Hadjipavlou** analyses a feature of walls familiar to her by virtue of her studies on peace and conflict resolution: when their physical, social and psychological substance starts to crumble and the process of reconciliation can begin, no matter how long it may be. In Cyprus this process began with people crossing from one side of the wall to the other, which enabled them to return to the homes they had left when the wall was built—in those homes they found “the others”, who were men and women just like them. Hadjipavlou observed this on both sides of the 112-mile wall which has separated Greek and Turkish Cypriots since 1974. On April 23rd 2003 five crossing points were opened to allow visits to the homes that Greek Cypriots had been forced to abandon on the Turkish side, and vice-versa. From this event the author observes how the reconciliation process develops and the stages through which it must pass to gain decisive momentum. The crossings brought to light the humanity of the Other—the individual perceived as a wrongdoer, but who proves to be no less a victim, living in the home of a family forced to abandon it and conserving the photographs of that family. The long reconciliation process (years if not decades) generates new systems of conviction, world views, attitudes, motivations, objectives and emotions which could form the bases of peaceful relations. But reconciliation must be supported by economic justice, power sharing, equality and the recognition of separate and multiple identities. Such a process clearly entails democratic governance and respect for human rights in the period following the conflict. The theoretical framework tested in various contexts around the world is here examined in Cyprus. Privileging the socio-psychological perspective and the idea of reconciliation, the chapter presents a number of individual stories of personal reconciliation after thirty

years of “mutual quarantine” on both sides of the island. The data are collected from individual interviews, direct observation and media reports. In divided societies, maintaining contact across ethnic, religious or geographical barriers is paramount for two significant reasons: first, it helps soften stereotypes and misperceptions and gradually complicates the “enemy image”; second, without institutional support these contacts can reaffirm old stereotypes or misperceptions (Allport 1954). Reconciliation is needed not only between the two communities but also within each of them, and not only by Greek and Turkish Cypriots but also within the broader Greek and Turkish communities, above all in political and social relations. Reconciliation also requires a re-learning and re-teaching of history on the basis of the principles of conflict resolution. Among other things, this should lead to the replacement of provocative symbols and military statues with monuments celebrating a common peace. It is argued that whereas individual contacts form part of an unofficial reconciliation process and constitute an element of informal peace education, they are not sufficient unless decision-makers legitimise these processes and provide adequate institutional infrastructures. On the strength of her experience in international organisations, the author concludes that those same organisations and the state should allocate resources for the creation of reconciliation centres where people can go to discuss and recover from their sense of loss, injustice and sorrow. The state should therefore encourage dialogue and the exchange of stories yet to be told. It should also promote socio-cultural awareness of the importance of the crossings by means of the mass media, intellectuals and universities on both sides.

In *“Israel-Palestine: concrete fences and fluid borders”* **Eliezer Ben-Rafael** and **Sigal Ben-Rafael Galanti** illustrate another possible relationship between a wall/fence and a border. In this case there is a clear contrast between the fixed character of the wall erected for the security of the Jews in Israel and the fluidity, or rather mobility, of the border—dozens of Jewish communities are allowed to establish settlements in Palestine, while individual Palestinians are left on the Israeli side of the border. To this should be added the continual changes among Israelis and Palestinians in zones A, B and C of the West Bank established by the Treaty of Oslo (Hilal and Petti 2011:180–184). From these premises the authors draw a number of conclusions. The first is that the Israeli-Palestinian border is not fixed, which means that the stronger party—Israel—has no interest in defining a border because it can always shift it to its own advantage, though this can add further conflicts to the existing one produced by the wall/fence. The authors present a historical overview of Israeli-Palestinian relations, the Intifadas and the Gaza wall (barrier), and a

prediction of the conflict's future. Focusing on the fence, the interpretation of how it came into existence is the centre of a great deal of controversy. On the Israeli side it is seen as means of security from terrorist attacks, while the Palestinians say it is an aggressive tool in a strategy of annexation. The Israeli High Court of Justice has made frequent pronouncements against the fence, and it has been condemned by many Israeli and Palestinian organisations, the United Nations and other international bodies, the European Union, the United States and the World Council of Churches. Some of the consequences of the fence are unexpected. Among these the authors indicate the non-separation of Israelis from Palestinians in some segments of the population, the repair of damaged roads and buildings and the return to a sort of normality; the fence has significantly improved the lives of many people by reducing terrorism and other illegal acts, and it continues to enjoy the overwhelming support of the Jewish population despite the campaigns against it. It is often featured in paintings, graffiti and political pamphlets. Under these conditions, awareness has grown that the fence provides security but does not ensure the prevention of terrorist attacks (which may pursue other avenues) and that it is there for the present but could in the future be taken down or forgotten. In these new conditions, therefore, borders become increasingly fluid and their fixing is postponed to a future time. Consequently, the only thing that we can certainly assume is that whenever Israelis and Palestinians finally decide to proceed from relative tranquility towards peace itself, everything that was considered as acquired and definitive will be re-questioned and redrawn. The barrier will undoubtedly become outdated, be demolished, and most probably will soon fall into oblivion.

In *“Ordinary everyday walls: normalising exception in segregated Belfast”* **Hastings Donnan** and **Neil Jarmal** contribute to discussion about the longevity and persistence of barriers in Belfast and offer an overview of the situation in the city. They provide a brief comparative review of the use of barriers as means to deal with conflict; outline the overall number and location of security barriers in Belfast; explore the wider framework of designing for security; and finally consider the attitudes of residents to the barriers as part of a wider debate about when and how they might begin to be removed some twenty years after the armed conflict was brought to an end. They thus look at another way of being for a wall. It has been seen that a wall tends to disappear over time, and here the focus is on how a wall (in this case a fence or barrier) changes function over time. When the original function of the wall has been lost, the time tends to be long. In general terms the change of function in time and space has been seen in cases of walls built in or around cities to defend

rulers and citizens (the castle, the walled city, the Alcazar, the Kremlin). The wall's defensive function declines, and it may be replaced by a park around the wall, a symbolic monument, a representation of community identity, a public place. These and other themes are explored by the authors in the context of Belfast, starting in 1969 with the outbreak of violence between Protestant unionists and Catholic nationalists. The state, first in the form of the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and after 2009 the Ministry of Justice, responded to these disorders with the construction of barriers and fences under military surveillance (therefore walls) to keep the two communities apart. Set up as an immediate solution to security problems, in the short term they were merely palliatives for deep-seated social and political problems, whereas in the long term the question was tackled by other means: debate, dialogue, negotiation and other political initiatives. Though these were the approaches eventually adopted by the state and the two communities, once the barriers had been built they developed inertias of their own which were difficult to remove. They thus reinforced differences and divisions and heightened feelings of territorial belonging, even though they might take on other meanings. With these walls, and even before their construction, the authors identify cycles of segregation between the Protestant unionists and Catholic nationalists. There were models of segregation in Belfast before 1969, manifested in better economic, social, educational and cultural prospects for Protestants, as well as favourable voting rights, all at the expense of the Catholics, who settled in Belfast later and inhabited the poorer areas of the city. The flaring of violence at the end of the 1960s resulted in the erection of walls (by 2011 there were 99 separate barriers in Belfast) and their militarisation to minimise the risks of violence and reciprocal intimidation. The first barriers (1969–70) divided, among other areas, the Falls from the Shankhill Road in west Belfast and Ardoyne from Glenbryn in the north. The authors' analysis of these and other walls of later construction is based on a survey of the attitudes expressed by people living in six neighbourhoods of Belfast, from which it appears that the maintenance of the walls is certainly linked to security, but value is also attached to their aesthetic dimension and their potential for tourism. Another significant factor is the realisation that the question was not simply the number of walls to be built to pacify the Protestant unionist community and the Catholic nationalist community by means of reciprocal security; it was also the streets and quarters where the walls were located and the decision-making processes lying behind the construction of what came to be called "peace walls". The primary decision-makers were central ministries and the local police, but subsequently municipal authorities and local parties and associations were involved in decision-making. This means that the decisions to build the walls, and later

to modify them, derived from an increasingly broad consensus among the actors in everyday urban life. These increasingly intensive social contacts produced “peace walls”, which are now perceived more positively as the meanings of security become more widely shared. Underlying this process is the new principle according to which good fences make good neighbours—this is true in Belfast insofar as good neighbours are also those who remain unseen and unheard. Here the state is variably present in interface areas; places where extraordinary historical events have left a trace that continues to generate novel political meanings and an exceptional response—the presence of barriers that help to sustain and reproduce perceptions of otherness and difference.

To summarise these analyses of walls (or fences) it should be said that they are tangible and they are generally found within cities—places of high relational density which require a substantial detaching factor (a wall) if artificial separation is to be achieved. But none of these walls (or fences) lasts forever. They fall because the factors which legitimised them disappear (the Berlin Wall and the Iron Curtain), or they take on new functions which tend to soften them and make them more compatible with everyday life (a tendency noted in the cases of Nicosia-Cyprus and Israel-Palestine), or they even become elements of peace and separation which do not separate, assuming the symbolic meanings of spaces (see Gasparini 2000:199–230), as is happening in Belfast. The only wall which remains a wall is the one dividing the Vatican City from Italy in Rome. That is because it does not mark a divide in everyday life (which is highly complementary across the two sides, if not integrated), but marks a political division between two states which are founded on, and legitimised by, radically different principles: the worldwide religious “empire” of Catholicism on the one hand, and the modern secular state, of which there are many, on the other.

The book concludes with a question around which its *fourth part* is organised: “*What happens after the wall?*”, which, as we have seen, is fated to change its nature and function or disappear. And that is all the more true when the wall is hard, when it is a fence.

One instrument for changing that hardness is identified in cooperation between the areas or cities which have been separated for years. A significant example has been seen in Belfast. Cooperation strengthens the weaker forms of the informal relations between the two sides, followed by mutual (non-stereotyped) awareness which fosters a positive vision of the other, and subsequent cooperation leads to an accentuation of the fusion of the two civil societies and their respective institutions, or at least to differentiated integration (see Gasparini 1994) between the two areas and/or towns. Cooperation is more marked in twin towns (Schultz 2009), which may even go so far as to

plan a new town in an original form. This trajectory is the subject of the two chapters which constitute the fourth part of the book.

Cooperation has a more positive future where it is a necessary condition for development, and twin towns are a case in point. These towns are generally engendered by, or at least have undergone, violent conflicts as a result of imperial interests or confrontations or highly conflictual political-strategic situations. The Rhine, for example, was for centuries a line of confrontation between France and German states. Between Germany and Poland there was confrontation across the border drawn in 1945 (Frankfurt-am-Oder-Słubice, Görlitz-Zgorzelec, Guben-Gubin), as there was between Poland and what is now Belarus (Brest-Terespol), but also on national borders inside the Soviet Union, between Estonia and Russia (Narva-Ivangorod) and Estonia and Latvia (Valga-Valka). Such twin towns have experienced and overcome their walls (ethnic as well as political) out of both necessity and self-interest, first developing close cooperation because it was convenient to do so, and then realising that the objectives were the same on either side of the wall and they should be pursued with the same means.

In *“European twin cities: models, examples and problems of formal and informal co-operation”* **Thomas Lundén** discusses the definition and current state of twin towns. The examples he provides are located on the borders of what was once the Tsarist Russian empire and is now the Russian Federation; in the intervening period most of them were borders between Soviet Socialist Republics. Situated at contiguous points on state borders, the twin towns in question are Tornio-Haparanda on the Finnish-Swedish border, Narva-Ivangorod on the Estonian-Russian border, and Valga-Valka on the Estonian-Latvian border with the appendage of a road—Savienība—located in Valka (Latvia) but with a majority of Estonian inhabitants. In each of the three cases, plus that of the road, the author analyses questions of internal integration, ethnicity, education, the mass media, communication and language, and in some of them citizenship, and interaction in shopping and daily life. Cross-border cooperation is flourishing between the Finnish Tornio (part of the Russian empire from 1809 to 1917) and the Swedish Haparanda, reflecting the intertwining histories of the two ethnic groups. Many people in the two towns know both languages, though the two bilingual schools are both in Haparanda and cross-border contacts are conducted increasingly in English. A particularly attractive feature of cooperation is a golf course built on the border wetlands separating Tornio and Haparanda. In spite of fairly successful cooperation, there is still much to be done in terms of language schools, health and ambulance services, fire and rescue services and the service sector in general. The construction of

cross-border cooperation between twin towns throws up particular problems when one of them is in a former communist country, because the relations on which cooperation is based have to start from scratch—all the more so when both countries emerged from the collapse of the Soviet Union. Such problems include state centralisation, lack of adequate structures for cross-border cooperation, differing degrees of competence on either side of the borders, lack of credibility of cooperation organisations, uneven development levels or rates between two states/twin towns, technology gaps, and customs regulations and taxation. In the cases of Narva-Ivangorod and Valga-Valka, the former dominant power (the Soviet Union) was not liked in what are now the new countries, which leads to discrimination against Russians in the attribution of citizenship to people not speaking Estonian or Latvian, and in the issue of visas to cross the border at the few crossing points. Although the majority of the population of Narva and Ivangorod is Russian, for the concession of citizenship the Estonian government insists on tests which are considered difficult, and many Russian-speaking adults refuse to learn the language of the smallest of the former Soviet republics. Moreover, there are contrasts involving Russians in both towns (Narva-Ivangorod) between the older and younger generations, leading to the development of a peculiar consciousness which separates Estonian Russians from Russian Russians. Similar problems are found in Valga and Valka, because both Estonia and Latvia have a fairly clear division of “nationalities” between the two majority populations, but with a large minority of ethnic Russians on both sides. There are only three crossing points, which makes for long waiting times to cross the border (half an hour, and much more on market days). Complicating matters still further is the presence of properly trained border guards on the Estonian side, while on the Latvian side border control is in the charge of military conscripts, who lack proper training and are more rigid than their counterparts.

The fourth part of the book concludes with predictions of what may happen in twin towns within ten to fifteen years after the disappearance of the walls.

In “*Scenario for the new city Gorizia/Gorica, former twin cities*” **Alberto Gasparini** considers two towns either side of the line between the imperial blocs in post-war Europe (the democratic West and the socialist East), specifically on the Italo-Yugoslav border. They are Gorizia and Nova Gorica, located north of the Adriatic Sea. The author goes from the general to the particular, from twin towns as a common configuration worldwide (because borders exist everywhere) to the process whereby they are transformed into joint towns which are then considered ‘normal’ because they are united and no longer divided by a political border. Starting from an outline of the basic features of twin towns and those defining normal towns, the author then considers

Gorizia and Nova Gorica in an exploration of the (possible) changes that they may undergo in the next fifteen years. The analysis focuses on levels of inter-penetration between the two cross-border towns, depending on juridical reciprocity; the medium-large and small state to which they respectively belong; whether the towns are divided by a natural border, whether their border comprises services and whether they are large or small towns; the roles of their respective minorities, and the age of the towns; whether there is differentiated integration or a shared orientation to create a joint town. These general features are common to many twin towns around the world and may be enhanced to varying degrees by the cultural institutions, journals and cross-border policies which the towns manage to establish. The author reviews classical border literature, and in particular certain American writings on the towns straddling the US-Mexican border. His attention then turns to the macro border axes in Europe formed by the Rhine between France, Luxembourg and Belgium on one side and Switzerland and Germany on the other, and Holland on the Rhine. He also analyses the axis formed by the corridor of the old Iron Curtain, as cooperation between long-separated twin towns opens up new potential advantages for both sides. Moving to the particular, the author illustrates the birth and development of cross-border cooperation between Gorizia and Nova Gorica. The first trace of Gorizia is in an imperial document (issued by Otto II) dated 1001, while Nova Gorica was founded in 1947 as an administrative centre for the part of the province of Gorizia ceded to Yugoslavia after the Second World War and to provide a socialist symbol for this new Yugoslav territory. Cross-border cooperation began in the late 1960s with an intensification of relations between the two mayors and municipal authorities, the formation of commissions working jointly and planning joint initiatives, and the constitution of research institutes for cultural initiatives and the publication of books and journals. Another facet of the possible future scenario is the theoretical basis for the foundation of the new town of Gorizia/Gorica. The basic values are co-existence as partial integration between the two towns, reciprocal enrichment, the central importance of the urban fabric and community creativity on which that urban centrality can be built. This is followed by an identification of the practical factors which may impede the development of Gorizia/Gorica new town, and those which favour the formation of a 'normal' new town. The last and most important section of the chapter concerns the construction of the new town in terms of the building of six scenarios centred on four time frames: the present, in five years' time, in ten years and in fifteen years. The scenarios least burdened by negative factors are the *first*, the impossible new town; the *fifth*, the realist block, and the *sixth*, the optimum new town. These three are less marked than the others by the frustration engendered by defeats and the distortion of what has been predicted. The *first* scenario starts from

the assumption that the *joint town is not desirable*, so that it is (ideologically) impossible to achieve. The *fifth* scenario perfects and spreads *differentiated integration* with a view to achieving the new town beyond the fifteen-year time frame. The *sixth* scenario sets out to establish Isonzopoli/Sočepolis (Gorizia/Gorica) within the fifteen years, but according to a linear process starting from the separate towns of Gorizia and Nova Gorica and passing through a phase of highly intensive differentiated integration. Which is the best of these three? The choice will obviously depend on the political, cultural and social will of both sides, but there is no doubt that the sixth scenario is the optimum choice for the goal of constructing the joint town of Isonzopoli/Sočepolis (or GO-NGO or Gorizia/Gorica, according to preference).

Concluding Remarks

By way of a conclusion, at least three ways in which walls are formed may be identified, and within them ten dimensions and characteristics of walls in evolution and in projection into a future without walls.

The first way of being a wall is represented by macro walls and the macro networks they entail; walls which are segmented in space and closely bound up with an empire—some of them are visible and others are invisible but no less real.

The second way of being a wall is represented by walls forming a hard separation in cities and areas divided by states and ethnic-national groups. The cases of Berlin, Vatican City-Italy, Nicosia and Cyprus, Israel-Palestine and Belfast stand as diverse examples of such walls.

However, also to be considered is what happens in the third way, which is that of no longer being a wall, no matter how formidable its past. The “post-wall” phase has yet to unfold, and it will depend on social creativity involving the tools of cooperation in cross-border areas and twin towns. It will also involve the planning and pursuit of what is desired for the future, which may entail the continuation of two separate towns, the modification of both with a strong bias towards differentiated integration, or unification into a single entity—with some distinctions remaining because of the persistence of a largely de-activated border.

Each chapter illuminates a different face of a wall and of how it is overcome with a view to achieving, in the short or long term, a form of peace which will have features varying according to the functions and ways of being a wall. Over time, these walls may assume the form of a border, or they may collapse, or they may remain but with different functions and meanings.

The first chapter captures the complexity of the forms and functions of the wall, which over time change it into something different. After a period of conflict, sometimes very bitter conflict, the wall serves the final objective of pacifying ethnic, national, political and social groups. The subsequent chapters analyse and interpret the many concrete ways of being a wall. Each chapter analyses a different form of these transformations, which may be summarised as follows:

- 1) *the wall being formed between the “new empire” of the European Union and peripheries marked by long-standing poverty and pervasive violence: the Iron Curtain between Europe and Africa (Max Haller);*
- 2) *walls within states and empires—they may easily appear and disappear, be visible or invisible and tangible or intangible (Melania-Gabriela Ciot);*
- 3) *the wall which performs the function of homeland security, but not national security, as would be expected from the construction of a fence (Dennis Soden and Alejandro Palma);*
- 4) *the real and ideological wall in a bi-polar international system, which is destined to disappear when its ideology and politics disappear (Anneli Ute Gabanyi);*
- 5) *the real political wall resulting from mediation, which does not vitiate the life of a city such as Rome: Republic of Italy-Vatican City (Domenico Mogavero);*
- 6) *the wall that gradually takes on a role of reconciliation between the populations on either side of it, which eventually take it down (Maria Hadjipavlou);*
- 7) *a concrete fence/wall accentuates conflicts when it does not coincide with state borders and even more when those borders are mobile and fluid: that is to say, when the border is uncertain and fails to provide security for the population in a position of weakness (Eliezer Ben-Rafael and Sigal Ben-Rafael Galanti);*
- 8) *the wall that changes function in that it becomes more symbolic and attached to new identities than to violence and the need for security (Hastings Donnan and Neil Jarmal);*
- 9) *the wall “breached” by cooperation, progressively changing into a border and twin towns, between democratic countries and between former Soviet republics (Thomas Lundén);*
- 10) *the wall which becomes a border, which in turn joins twin towns in a new town, according to possible and probable future scenarios (Alberto Gasparini).*

